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1. Introduction 
 
The collapse of the communist system during the late 1980’s redefined the 
hierarchy among Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the former 
USSR. Some of these countries joined the EU3; some did not4; others formed the 
CIS5. In particular, institutions, mainly market and political one, appear to be a strong 
foundation for a rapid but irreversible shift from socialism to market-oriented 
economy (JOHNSON, KAUFMANN & SHLEIFER, 1997; NAGY, 2002). The 
relationship between economic performance and the quality of domestic institutions 
has emerged recently as a major subject of interest. The literature shows that the 
higher the quality of domestic institutions (RODRIK & SUBRAMANIAN, 2003) 
the better the effects on the Human development and growth of a country (DE 
LONG & SHLEIFER, 1993; EASTERLY & LEVINE, 2002; KAUFMANN & 
KRAAY, 2002; KAUFMANN, KRAAY & ZOIDO-LOBATÓN, 2002; 
KAUFMANN, KRAAY & MASTRUZZI, 2005; KNACK & KEEFER, 1995; 
MAURO, 1995; MÉON & SEKKAT, 2004). 
The aim of this paper is to analyse in a more qualitative way the role of 
institutions in transitional countries in the CEECs and CIS. The main question we 
address is: what kind of institutional arrangement leads to Human development? We 
propose an analytical pattern where global performance (i.e. Human development) is 
the final outcome of a new institutional arrangement. 
As NORTH and THOMAS (1973) and NORTH (1981, 1990) stressed, 
institutions are important for the development of a country and are an endogenous 
element of a country’s economic growth. For NORTH (1990, p.3), institutions are 
“the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction” including formal 
institutions (law and regulation) and informal ones (convention). Similarly SCOTT 
(1995, p.33) defines institutions as “cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behaviours”. SCHOTTER (1981, p. 11.) shows 
that institutions do not only represent legal and governmental structures and 
regulations. They also represent the different interests of organisations and the 
regularity in social behaviours that specify action in recurrent situations. For HARE 
(2001, p. 5) institutions have four major characteristics: “(a) they regulate economic 
behaviour in ways which, in the short run, often conflict with individual preferences; (b) they are 
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based on shared expectations, derived from custom, trust, legal provisions, etc.; (c) they make most 
sense if the economy is thought of as a “repeated game” in which most types of transaction occur 
many times; and (d) anonymity, in the sense that the functioning of a given institution should not be 
dependent upon the identity of the economic agents seeking to conduct the types of transaction to 
which this institution relates.” 
In the new institutional economics perspective, the creation and preservation 
of market supporting institutions, centred on property rights, commercial law, 
regulation concerning licensing, credit, and the setting up of business enterprises, 
have been seen as important. In transition countries, economic institutions (i.e. 
market institutions) are a necessary condition but, as we will notice it later, they aren’t 
a sufficient one. 
After 1989, the transition process has introduced a breakdown in economic 
efficiency and has generated an ‘institutional vacuum’ (GROGAN & MOERS, 2001, p. 
327; MOERS, 1999). Former communist institutions needed to be adapted and 
reshaped to fit the new economic rules. Simultaneously, new institutions needed to 
be introduced and built to support a market-oriented economy and also democracy 
(DABROWSKI & GORTAT, 2002). Moreover, local reluctances could appear 
among actors unwilling to get rid of their former but outdated practices and/or 
unable to adopt new ones. Hence, the success of the transition process was 
depending on the willingness of local governments to set up an institutional pattern 
able to boost the economic development and the political reform. As 
GLOBERMAN and SHAPIRO (2002, p. 42) wrote: “political governance matters and 
improved political governance does not necessarily oblige governments to make large investments of 
taxpayers’ money (…..) Indeed, improved governance might be more consistent, in many cases, with 
a smaller economic and regulatory role for governments.”  
As shown by various authors, the weak and not adapted institutional pattern, 
inherited from the communist era, has been a barrier to development (BEVAN, 
ESTRIN & MEYER, 2004; BEVAN, ESTRIN, 2004; DABROWKI & GORTAT, 
2002; POURNARAKIS & VARSAKELIS, 2004; TIDRICO, 2006; YEAGER, 
1999). Indeed, political institutions i.e. “new” rules of the political game6 should be 
considered. In other words, a broader institutional pattern needs to be constructed in 
order to embrace wider concepts able to explain the mechanism underlying 
economic development. Among them the complementarities between economic and 
political institutions and the quality of the institutional arrangement seems to be 
particularly relevant.  
We will organise our research as follow. In a first part (2), we analyse the 
relationship between institutions, growth and Human development in a transitional 
context. In a second part (3), we test our hypotheses and finally (4), we will conclude 
on the relevance of our results. 
 
2. Institutions, Growth and Human development in Transition: a 
complex relationship 
 
The question we address in this section is: what does theory tell us about 
growth and Institutions relationship (2.1) and to what extent do institutions matter to 
enhance Human development (2.2). Transitional countries suppose we develop an 
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analytical pattern able to explain the wide variations in the impact of institutional 
reform across countries (2.3). 
 
 
2.1. Institutions, Growth and Human development: a short survey 
The quest of reliable and safe institutions has recently emerged in the 
economic literature. Since the beginning of the 90’s, numerous authors have studied 
the relationship between institutions and growth (BARDHAN, 2005). They stressed 
on the sense of the causality between good institutions, growth and development. 
For HALL and JONES (1999), ACEMOGLU and al. (2004), KAUFMANN and 
KRAAY (2003), good institutions stimulate growth and development rather than the 
contrary. KAUFMANN and KRAAY (2002) noticed that the quality of institutions 
has an impact on growth but the reverse influence depends on the democratisation 
process and on the public governance. ACEMOGLU and al. (2001, 2002, 2005) 
show that quality of institutions have a more important effect on long term growth 
than on short term one. RESNIK and BIRSNER (2006) are not sure that good 
institutions governance has a positive effect on economic development. Finally, for 
CAROTHERS (2003) the transfer of market institutions to developing or transitional 
countries is difficult. As numerous authors pointed it out, the success of these 
transfers depends on path dependence and local abilities to make them effective 
within a local institutional arrangement (EDISON, 2003; GWARTNEY, 
HOLCOMBE & LAWSON, 2004; RODRIK & SUBRAMANIAN, 2003).  
Nevertheless, the authors have developed different methodological 
approaches so that the results aren’t homogenous. Moreover, most of the 
contributions consider institutions as a bloc and do not make a difference between 
endogenous and exogenous institutions. In our opinion, taking into account such 
differences is particularly relevant in transition. For example, exogenous institutions 
like informal rules, social norms or values may be “sticky” so that it may take a long 
time to reshape them. Accordingly, in a context of transition, the ‘communist past 
dependency’ is important (FABRY & ZEGHNI, 2006; ZWEYNERT & 
GOLDSCHMIDT, 2005). 
 
2.2. Building an institutional framework 
Two kinds of institutions should be distinguished: first, the formal institutions, 
mainly endogenous, at the economic, legal and political level; second, the informal 
institutions, exogenous, rooted in the social area and, for those reasons, more complex 
to capture. 
The functional typology of formal Institutions proposed by RODRIK and 
SUBRAMANIAN (2003) helps us to specify what a good market oriented 
institutional pattern could be. The first institution represents the rule of law and the 
next three institutions contribute to the emergence of a social consensus about risks, 
burden and prosperity sharing in a context of a market-oriented economy. 
• The Market creating institutions represent the rules of law that clearly define and 
protect property rights and make contracts fair and reliable for all actors. Based 
on a clear legislation and on an efficient and fair judicial system, they reduce 
transaction costs and create incentives for investment and private sector 
development. In such a context of transparency, the degree of corruption should 
be low. 
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• The Market regulating institutions help to regulate market externalities, imperfect 
and asymmetric information or scale economies in sectors like transportation, 
telecommunication or environment. The regulation focuses on Fair competition 
(for example, access to land and construction permit), minimize distortions, and 
enhance Privatisation and Deregulation. 
• The Market stabilising institutions reduce macroeconomic instabilities (low inflation 
rate, currency rate stability, balanced budget, financial discipline, fiscal rules, tax 
burden, trade policy, and banking system). They should also prevent major 
political risks and crisis (political and governmental stability, public 
administration and quality of local bureaucracy improvement).  
• The Market legitimising institutions support social protection and manage social 
conflicts. It can be an insurance system or a welfare system that protects a minima 
people from a social dropping out. These institutions create favourable socio-
economic conditions (Insurance system, welfare system, Education, 
infrastructures, and business development). 
 
As far as political institutions are concerned, GERRING and THACKER 
(2001) consider the Democracy (i.e. free election, exit voice phenomenon), the 
Constitutional structures (i.e. Federalist or unitary State), and the State capacities (i.e. 
technical and administrative capacity to rule the country, corruption) as important 
elements. Political institutions are not only complementary to economics ones but 
they are also mutually reinforcing. For example, the transparency of the government 
actions contributes to shape a stable environment for actors. 
Informal institutions rely on culture, mentalities, habits, trust, norms, 
conventions, codes, networks and even on nationalism (acceptance to sell national 
assets to foreigners, Ethnic tensions) or religion (Religious tensions). As KNOWLES 
& WEATHERSTON (2006) noticed, informal institutions, assimilated to culture 
(TABELLINI, 2005) or social capital (PUTNAM & al., 1993), are fundamental in 
explaining development and income differences. In some transitional countries, 
informal institutions play a major role (JÜTTING, 2003). They may pave the way to 
social and cultural stickiness (i.e. reluctances to change practices and habits) in case 
of inadequacy with formal institutions.  
Formal institutions are introduced and imposed by the State in a top down 
logic and informal institutions are developed by the community in a bottom up logic. 
To avoid constraints and institutional uncertainty, transitional countries need to set 
up rapidly a new institutional pattern. Therefore, the quality and the speed of the 
local arrangement becomes a key factor to human development (NAGY, 2002). 
 
2.3. Transition and the quality of the institutional arrangement  
RODRIK (2004) argues that each stage of economic development implies 
different ‘institutional arrangements’. A catching up process may involve some originality 
in an institutional pattern, depending on each country’s characteristics. We consider 
that a good institutional arrangement is the interplay between a new set of formal 
economic and political rules (mostly imported or inspired from western practices7) 
and a set of informal institutions. That compatibility (or incompatibility) between 
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these types of institutions may explain the wide variations in the impact of law and 
institutional reform across countries. 
To understand the nature of the local institutional arrangement we need to 
consider different areas of interactions such as the social structure of the country, the 
rules of the games, the play of the game, the allocation mechanism (JÜTTING, 
2003). If the rules are efficient, the economic, political, legal and social interactions 
will create effective conditions for growth and Human development. Consequently, 
our first hypothesis is:  (H1) Institutions have a direct link on Human development. 
A complete set of formal institutions is composed of market institutions 
supported by political institutions to avoid stickiness or incompatibility between 
imported rules and local practices. Our second hypothesis is:  (H2) Market institutions 
supported by reliable political institutions will enhance human development ceteris paribus. 
The local Institutional arrangement is a recombination (DJELIC & QUACK 
2003) that includes institution building (creation) but also institution reshaping (i.e. 
redeployment of resources in a context of communist legacy) in order to create a 
new environment for business. Our last hypothesis is: (H3): A rapid institutional 
recombination will enhance Human development ceteris paribus.  
The speed of institutional recombination depends on the matching of formal 
institutions with informal once. For the new EU Members States, the process of 
integration, the cultural proximity and historical links with old members should make 
easier the matching process than for CIS members. The analytical framework is 
resumed in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The hypothesis of our model 
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Our purpose now is to give more content to the link “Institutions and 
Human development” by doing an empirical analyse.  
 
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
In the present section we will present our methodology and data (3.1.), our 
model specification (3.2.) and finally our results and comments (3.3.). 
 
 
3.1. Methodology and data 
We test the hypothesis stated in the previous section. The choice of 
representative variables to measure institutions (3.1.1) and Human development 
(3.1.2) is important in a context of abundant but controversial literature.  
 
3.1.1. Measuring institutions 
Measuring Institutions is subjective and complex. Formal institutions are 
measured by various proxies resuming the assessments of experts on different 
aspects of the institutional environment such as corruption, bureaucracy, law, 
property rights protection, etc. It is subjective because based on the economic actors’ 
perceptions and feelings. Nevertheless, an objective measure of such institutions does not 
exist8. 
Informal institutions play an important role in Human development process 
(DENZAU & NORTH, 1994; HELMKE & LEVITSKY, 2004; MANTZAVINOS, 
NORTH & SHARIQ, 2004; OECD, 2006; ROGOFF, 2003). NORTH (1990, p.36) 
wrote: “it is much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that societies devise than 
to describe and be precise about the informal ways by which human beings have structured human 
interaction. But although they defy, for the most part, neat specification and it is extremely difficult 
to develop unambiguous tests of their significance, they are important.”  
Informal institutions are generally captured by survey data based on people’s 
declarations about their beliefs and wisdoms. To estimate informal institutions, authors 
(KNACK, 2001; KNACK & KEEFER, 1995, 1997; KNOWLES & 
WEATHERSTON, 2006; LA PORTA & al., 1997) use the World Value Survey9 
(WVS) which is based on a great survey data covering 85 countries and describing 
people’s beliefs on 7 topics (Perceptions of Life, Environment, Work, Family, 
Politics and Society, Religion and Morale, National Identity). Data are not available 
for all the countries we have selected in our panel, and the set of questions available 
within the WVS do not fit all our needs. We have introduced two other criteria: the 
percentage of national or ethnic minorities in the population of a country and, the 
degree of corruption. 
The percentage of national or ethnic minorities in the population of a country 
is relevant because most of the countries of our panel have a strong national or 
ethnic minority. For example, it’s an important phenomenon that had led to civil war 
in former Yugoslavia or in Tajikistan last decade. Moreover, the good treatment of 
                                                     
8 For a more extensive view concerning Data Bases on Governance Index see DUC C. & 
LAVALLEE E. (2004) 
9 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org  
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the national or ethnic minority by the government is one of the Amsterdam’s criteria 
to access to the EU Membership. The degree of corruption is a proxy of informal 
practices in a society. For example, a high level of corruption deters foreigners to 
develop business or to set up affiliates. Corruption creates an unstable and unsafe 
environment for business because of the opacity of the rules for the outsiders 
(GRAY & al., 2004).  
 
Table 1 - Measure of Formal Institutional quality and choice of representative variables 
PRS Index The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the PRS Group rating comprises 22 variables in 3 
subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. The Political Risk index provides a means of assessing the 
political stability of the countries. It is based on a score of 100 points. The Economic Risk index provides a means of 
assessing a country’s current economic strengths and weaknesses. In general terms when strengths outweigh 
weaknesses, the country will present a low economic risk and reversely, when weaknesses outweigh strengths, it will 
present a high economic risk. The Index is based on a score of 50 points. The Financial Risk index provides a means 
of assessing a country’s ability to pay its way. In essence, this requires a system of measuring a country’s ability to 
finance its official, commercial, and trade debt obligations. It is based on a score of 50 points. The total points from 
the three indices are divided by two to produce the weights for inclusion in the composite country risk score. The 
composite scores, ranging from zero to 100, are then broken into categories from Very Low Risk (80 to 100 points) 
to Very High Risk (zero to 49.5 points). Source: http://www.prsgroup.com (Free and open data) 
Index of 
Economic  
Freedom 
The Index of Economic Freedom is provided by Heritage Foundation and concerns 161 countries. It is composed 
by 50 independent variables split into 10 categories of economic freedom. For each country, this index gives an 
economic freedom score that is the simple average of the ten categories average score. The score is ranking from 0 
(bad) to 100 (best). Source: http://www.heritage.org (Free and open data) 
Frazer 
Index 
The Frazer index is provided by the Frazer Institute and covers 5 categories: the size of governments, the legal 
structures and security of property rights, the access to sound money, the freedom to trade internationally the 
regulation of credit, labour and business. It concerns in 2004, 132 countries. The score is ranking from 1 (very bad) 
from 9 (excellent). Source: http://www.freetheworld.com (Free and open data) 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
KAUFMANN, KRAAY & MASTRUZZI (2005) have developed the World Bank Governance Indicators 
concerning the period 1996-2004, covering 6 categories of governance: voice and accountability (measuring political 
and civil right); the political instability and violence (measuring the likelihood of violent threats to or changes in 
government), the government effectiveness (measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public 
service delivery), the regulatory burden (measuring the incidence of market unfriendly policies), the rule of law 
(measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts…) and the control of corruption 
(measuring the exercise of public power for private gain including corruption and state capture). The 6 governance 
score are ranking from -2,5 (bad governance) to 2,5 (best governance). Source: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data/html (Free and open data) 
EBRD  
Indicators  
The EBRD provided 2 main types of indicators : 
The structural change indicators are a quantitative foundation for analysing progress in transition. They contain structural 
and institutional indicators in the areas of enterprises, markets and trade, financial sector and infrastructure. The data 
are based on a wide variety of sources, including national authorities, other international organisations and EBRD 
staff estimates. To strengthen the degree of cross-country comparability, some of the data were collected through 
standardised EBRD surveys of national authorities. 
The transition indicators have to track reform developments in all countries of operations since the beginning of 
transition. Progress is measured against the standards of industrialised market economies, while recognising that 
there is neither a “pure” market economy nor a unique and rapid end-point for transition. The measurement scale 
for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy 
and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialised market economy. Assessments are made in 9 areas: large scale 
privatisation, small scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and foreign 
exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions, and infrastructure. Source: http://www.ebrd.org (Free and open data) 
 
 
3.1.2. Measuring Human Development 
As shown by DESAI (1991) or GERRING and THACKER (2001), it is not 
easy to measure Human development. The current literature uses three types of 
indicators resumed in table 2: 
The Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) seems to be the best criteria because it is easily 
available and its variance between the countries composing our panel is important 
and reflect the differences in level of development (see graph 1 & 2 in annex). 
Furthermore, as LAZAROVA (2006) or MISHRA and NEWHOUSE (2007) 
stressed, good institutional governance is supposed to have a positive effect on infant 
mortality rate. Moreover, ZWEIFEL and NAVIA (2000) or NAVIA and ZWEIFEL 
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(2003) have shown that the level of IMR is linked to the political regime: IMR is 
higher in a dictatorship than in a democracy. 
 
Table 2 – Measure of Human Development 
Type Indicator Choice criterion 
Income measures Index of poverty rate It’s very ambiguous to use this type of index in the case of the 
poorest economies where informal market and informal revenue 
play an important role.  
Combinatorial indices Human Development Index 
Physical Quality of Life Index 
For these two index, the risk of endogeneity between variables is 
very high 
Measures of mortality Child Mortality Rate (1-5 year) 
Life expectancy 
Infant Mortality Rate (0-1 year) 
Child mortality is not sufficiently available for our  panel. 
Life expectancy is too stationary for a short period. 
IMR is more convenient for an analysis and well reflect the 
differences of quality of life between different countries (its 
variance is greater than the variance of life expectancy). 
 
 
3.2. Model specification 
We distinguish two categories of host countries, the new EU members 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Romania and Bulgaria); and the CIS (Russia and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan)10. The 
new EU members are middle income countries and may be considered as leading 
reformers (DABROWSKI & GORTAT, 2002). They entered the European Union in 
2004 and in 2007, and have more efficient institutions thanks to the close fulfilment 
of the Acquis communautaire criterion (i.e. the convergence towards EU best practices). 
The CIS countries are late-comers in transition and thus are less advanced in 
reforms. They have a lower income than new EU members and still have an 
immature capitalism and Democracy. 
The period concerned by our empirical analysis is 1994-2006. Traditionally, 
authors use cross sectional analysis (GROGAN & MOERS, 2001; POURNARAKIS 
& VARSAKELIS, 2004) but few use pooled regression which combine time series 
and cross sectional data (DEMEKAS & al. 2005). In the present empirical analysis, 
we use pooled regression which we consider as a relevant methodology for 
heterogeneous data and a relative short time series. The equation is tested through 
the generalized least square (GLS) method to avoid heteroscedasticity. Our empirical 
model is built for each year t and for each host country c. The specification of the 
model is as follows: 
IMRct = c0 + ά1 GDPPCct + ά2 FORMALct + ά3 INFORMALct + ε 
 
The explained variable IMRct is the infant mortality rate for each year t in each 
host country c. It is the number of child death under 1 year per 1000 birth. Among 
the independent variables, GDPPCct represents the real growth rate of GDP per capita 
for each year t in each host country c. It should be a proxy for growth 
(CHAKRABARTI, 2001) and will be used as a control variable to capture the 
demand impact that may boost the economic activity (see annex, graph 3 & 4). An 
improvement of GDPPC should enhance a decrease of IMR so that the expected 
sign should be negative.  
 
                                                     
10 Turkmenistan has been excluded from our panel because of it discontinued membership. Since 
August 26, 2005 it is an associate member of the CIS. 
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As developed in Table 3, the variable FORMAL represents formal 
institutions. To measure market institutions we have chosen some EBRD Transition 
Index. All these indexes vary from 1 (very bad) to 4+ (excellent). An improvement of 
market institutions should enhance a decrease of IMR. The expected sign of all 
market institutions variables should be negative.  
 
Table 3 – Representative Variables for Formal and Iformal Institutions 
Institution Indicators Description Exp. 
sign 
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS - Market institutions 
Market 
creating 
institutions 
Enterprise 
Reform (ER) 
The variable ER represents the EBRD index of enterprise reform for 
each country j and year t. To capture progress in enterprise reform, 
EBRD retains, for its evaluation, criteria such as the reduction of 
budgetary subsidies to enterprises, the improvement of tax collection, the 
share of industry in total employment and the change in labour 
productivity. ER varies from 1 (no progress) to 4+ (excellent near 
standard of advanced economies (Source: EBRD, Transition Report) 
- 
Market 
Regulating 
Institutions 
Competition 
Policy (CP) 
The variable CP is for country j and year t the EBRD index of 
competition policy. CP should measure the progress in the reform of 
competition policy. This is an evaluation of privatization in a quantitative 
perspective (share of private enterprise) but also in a qualitative one 
(efficiency of privatization method, the result of a privatized enterprise, 
and a share of foreign investor in capital). CP varies from 1 (low) to 4+ 
(excellent). (Source: EBRD, Transition Report) 
- 
Market 
Stabilizing 
Institutions 
Banking 
Reform & 
Interest Rate 
liberalization 
(BR) 
The variable BR is for country c and year t the EBRD Index of Banking 
Reform. BR should measure the progress in the reform of banking 
sector. This is an evaluation of privatization, and performance of 
regulation system of this sector. BR varies from 1 (low) to 4+ (excellent) 
(Source: EBRD, Transition Report) 
- 
Market 
Legitimizing 
Institutions 
Expenditure on 
Health and 
Education 
(EHE) 
The variable EHE is for country c and year t the expenditure on health 
and education as a percentage of GDP. These expenditures are those 
from general government, excluding those by state-owned enterprises. 
The expected sign should be positive because EHE reflects the 
improvements of the local social and human capital. (Source: EBRD, 
Transition Report) 
- 
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS - Political institutions 
Democracy Democracy 
Score ranking 
(DSR) 
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest 
level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. DSR is an average of 
ratings for Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media 
(IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic 
Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI); and 
Corruption (CO), (Source : Freedom House) 
+ 
Constitutio-
nal 
Structures 
Federalism 
degree (FD) 
Dummy = 0 for unitary country 
Dummy = 1  for semi-federalism or federalism  ? 
State 
Capacities 
General 
Government 
Debt (GGD)  
GGD is the percentage of General Government Debt in the GDP. 
(Sources : EBRD, Transition Report.) + 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
Importance 
of 
Minorities 
% of 
Minorities in 
the Total 
population (M) 
Minorities> 10% of Total population = Dummy = 1 
Minorities< 10% of Total population = Dummy = 0 
? 
Index of 
Corruption 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index (CPI) 
This factor relies on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), which measures the level of corruption in 152 countries. 
(Source : Transparency International) 
- 
 
For the political institutions we have chosen three indicators. The first is the 
Democracy Score Ranking provided by the Freedom House. The expected sign is 
positive because we suppose that an improvement of DSR (ie. an improvement of 
democracy) should also induce and improvement of IMR.  The second index is the 
federalism degree (FD). To measure it we have chosen a dummy variable (0 = Unitary 
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State, 1 = Semi-Federalism or Federalism). The expected sign is not obvious in the 
case of transition countries and could be influenced by the history of each country. 
The third index is the percentage of General Government debt (GGD) in he GDP 
provided by EBRD. The expected sign is positive. A reduction of GGD means an 
improvement of the financial situation of the country and should facilitate a 
reduction of IMR. Consequently, we suppose that GGD and IMR vary in the same 
way. 
The Variable INFORMAL represents informal institutions. To measure 
informal institutions we use the percentage of national or ethnic minority (M) in the 
population of a country. If the minority represent more than 10% of the population 
the dummy takes the value 1 and if the minority represent less than 10%, the dummy 
takes the value 0. The expected sign is not clear. We also use the Corruption 
Perception Index provided by Transparency International. The expected sign is 
negative because we suppose that CPI and IMR vary in an opposite way.  
 
The pattern of our model is resumed in figure 2 below. All these variables are 
proxies of the perceived quality of the formal and informal institutions. These 
measures are subjective but close to the actor’s perceptions of the local business 
environment climate.  
 
Figure 2: The model tested 
IMR
Dependent
variable
Demand
Formal
Institutions
GDPPC
expected sign (-)
Market creating ER
expected sign (-)
Market regulating CP
expected sign (-)
Market stabilizing BR
expected sign (-)
Market
legitimizing
EHE
expected sign (-)
Democracy
DSR
expected sign (+)
Market
institutions
Political
institutions
Constitutional
structure
FD
expected sign (?)
State capacities GGD
expected sign (+)
Informal
Institutions
Minorities M
expected sign (?)
Corruption CPI
expected sign (-)
Independent
variable
Control variable
Independent
variable
Independent
variable
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3.3. Empirical Results 
 
3.3.1. The new EU Members 
For the New EU Members panels (Table 4), in all the equations tested, adjusted 
R2 and the F-test results have acceptable values; the control variable has the expected 
sign and is statistically significant.  The sign of the intercept is positive and 
significant, informing us that, if all independent variables where null, IMR would 
increase. The control variable (GDPPC) is negative and significant. An increase in 
income per capita plays a positive role on IMR improvement. This effect is relatively 
weak because GDPPC does not reflect the inequalities in income distribution among 
the population.  
 
Table 4 – Results for the New EU Members 
Variable Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) 
C 20.67490 
(0.0000) 
30.10685 
 (0.0000) 
9.414700 
(0.0000) 
20.92548 
(0.0000) 
16.76249 
 (0.0000) 
GDPPC -0.000276 
(0.0000) 
-0.000511 
 (0.0000) 
-0.000632 
(0.0000) 
-0.000496 
(0.0000) 
-0.000863 
(0.0000) 
ER -2.112393 
(0.0006) 
-1.250172 
(0.1224) 
  -1.715347 
(0.0137) 
  
CP -2.223382 
 (0.0000) 
-2.049618 
 (0.0008) 
  -1.597968 
(0.0016) 
  
BR -0.243262 
 (0.6098) 
-0.614309 
 (0.2487) 
  0.582632 
(0.2756) 
  
EHE -0.075099 
 (0.5250) 
-0.686977 
 (0.0000) 
  -0.295312 
(0.0061) 
  
DSR 1.426482 
(0.0000) 
  3.460413 
 (0.0000) 
2.041604 
(0.0000) 
  
FD -4.116091 
 (0.0000) 
  -1.260707 
(0.0213) 
-1.636114 
(0.0002) 
  
GGD 0.013009 
 (0.0014) 
  0.009846 
(0.0182) 
0.005875 
(0.1649) 
  
M 3.295334 
 (0.0000) 
     0.309289 
(0.5720) 
CPI 0.054823 
 (0.0001) 
     -0.059389 
(0.0004) 
Adjusted R2 0.894870  0.858903  0.880267  0.849701  0.888161 
S.E. of reg. 1.700233  2.090106  2.143648  1.825054  2.925273 
DW. 0.787510 0.436321 0.665013 0.612625 0.395557 
Prob. (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total panel : 130 – period: 1994 – 2006 – Numbers in brackets are probabilities 
 
 
The results for the market institutions are ambiguous. CP has the expected sign 
and is significant; ER has the expected sign but is significant at 12% in equation (2); 
BR is never significant and EHE has the expected sign but is not statistically 
significant in equation (1). Nevertheless, in equation (2) where market institutions are 
tested alone, only CP and EHE are significant and have the expected sign. We can 
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note that in equation (2) EHE becomes significant but plays a weak role. This 
weakness of the influence of EHE (not significant in eq. (1) and weak role in eq. (2 
and 4)) may be explained by the fact that in the New EU Members, the reform of 
Health System has reduced the positive impact of Health Public Spending on IMR. 
Market institutions influence IMR when they are estimated alone (eq. 2). 
For the political institutions in equation (1), all variables are significant. DSR 
plays a positive and important role on IMR confirming most of the precedent 
studies. FD plays a negative role. The existence of semi-federalism or federalism may 
facilitate greater inequalities between regions than in a unitary State. Nevertheless, 
when political institutions are tested alone in equation (3), DSR plays the major role 
on IMR. Finally, GGD is significant and has the expected sign in equation (1) and (3) 
but the influence on IMR is weak.  
In equation (4) we have tested all the variable representing formal 
institutions. The results confirm the equation (1) where all variables where tested. 
The major difference is for GGD who become not significant on equation (4). 
The results for informal institutions are not really satisfying and stable. M is 
positive and significant in equation (1) but not in eq. (5) and CPI is significant but 
has not the expected sign in equation (1). One explanation may be that in the new 
EU countries, the minority problem seems to be resolved because it was a 
prerequisite to entry the EU. Corruption has a positive impact on IMR. One 
explanation may be that corruption permits a better access to the new health and 
care system11. Equation (5) where informal institutions are tested alone, confirm that 
M is not significant but CPI has the expected sign contrary to equation (1). The 
interpretation for informal institutions is difficult and ambiguous.  
 
 
3.3.2. The CIS Members 
For the CIS members (Table 5), except in equation (3), the sign of the intercept 
is positive but not always significant (eq. 1,3,4). The control variable (GDPPC) is 
negative but significant for equation (2, 4 and 5). An increase in income per capita 
plays a positive role on IMR improvement. This effect is relatively weak because 
GDPPC does not reflect the inequalities in income distribution among the 
population which is important in CIS countries. 
As far as the formal institutions are concerned, the results aren’t always 
significant for ER and CP. In equation (1), the results are relevant but in equation (2) 
and (4), only EHE is significant. BR has unstable results: it is not significant in 
equation (2) and has not the expected sign in equation (1 and 4). The reform of the 
banking system may not be efficient and the banking system may not be spread out 
in the society. These results may be confirmed by the importance of EHE for these 
countries. Public Health Spending seems to play a major role contrary to the New 
EU Members. Nevertheless equation (2) where market institutions are tested alone, 
ER remains not significant, CP and BR become not significant and EHE stays 
statistically significant and has the expected sign. Market institutions seem to be less 
important than in the New EU Members. The impact of European integration and 
the proximity (geographically and historically) of the New EU Members with “old” 
EU members States could be an important explanation for this differences. 
                                                     
11
 It corresponds to the payment of a specific amount of money to avoid queuing  and so to access 
rapidly to health care on a “private” base. 
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For the political institutions in equation (1) all variables are significant. DSR 
plays a positive and major role on IMR but DSR plays a higher role in the case of 
CIS Members than in the case of New EU ones reflecting the gap in term of 
democracy between CIS members and New EU Members. FD has a negative sign 
confirming that a unitary State is more favourable to an improvement of IMR than 
federalism. GGD is significant and has the expected sign reflecting that a high level 
in debt deters IMR. In equation (4) where all variables concerning formal institutions 
are tested, political institutions seem to have a major role. Compared to New EU 
Members, in the CIS countries, the role of market institutions is less important. On 
the contrary, EHE and BR have a higher importance. 
 
Table 5 – Results for the CIS Members 
Variable Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) 
C 9.905933 
 (0.3467) 
84.01087 
 (0.0000) 
-1.653600 
(0.7000) 
3.480493 
(0.7836) 
55.87661 
(0.0000) 
GDPPC -0.001459 
(0.3195) 
-0.008738 
(0.0000) 
-0.001159 
(0.4096) 
-0.004758 
(0.0093) 
-0.009020 
(0.0000) 
ER -8.268912 
 (0.0494) 
-0.305862 
 (0.9640) 
  -3.237669 
(0.5126) 
  
CP -12.29782 
(0.0008) 
-2.827724 
(0.6697) 
  -5.922477 
(0.1876) 
  
BR 17.89340 
 (0.0000) 
-5.577435 
(0.2779) 
  9.681831 
(0.0314) 
  
EHE -2.299500 
 (0.0000) 
-2.160779 
(0.0002) 
 -1.288856 
(0.0005) 
 
DSR 10.37315 
 (0.0000) 
 8.653749 
 (0.0000) 
10.19060 
(0.0000) 
 
FD -19.28310 
 (0.0001) 
 -21.71945 
(0.0000) 
-11.68529 
(0.0405) 
  
GGD 0.212563 
(0.0000) 
 0.137135 
(0.0005) 
0.095150 
(0.0499) 
  
M 18.01376 
(0.0000) 
   10.55482 
(0.0000) 
CPI -0.704215 
(0.0000) 
   -0.462366 
(0.0103) 
Adjusted R2  0.712332  0.222837  0.687899  0.703000  0.856644 
S.E. of reg.  12.51766  21.53323  17.15373  15.13772  21.17066 
DW. 0.721405 0.064627 0.231776 0.241569 0.135381 
Prob. (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total panel : 143  – period: 1994 – 2006 – Numbers in brackets are probabilities 
 
In equation (1) as in the equation (5), the informal institutions are significant and 
have the expected signs. We can observe the influence of minorities in the negative 
evolution of IMR. It is not really surprising in countries with a high degree of 
minorities no protected and most of the time excluded from the political decision 
process. Finally, the existence of corruption plays a negative role on IMR.  
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The two groups of countries have specific results. The initial level of 
development combined with the historic and political anchorage to EU versus Russia, 
explain these results. The results of our empirical test appear to confirm our 
expectation that IMR is sensitive to specific and local institutional arrangements 
telling us that our first hypothesis (H1) may not be rejected. (H2) through the 
equation (4) is also confirmed for both panel so as (H3). The combination of formal 
and informal institutions may explain the improvement of the Human development 
of each country.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
IMR in new EU members is linked to demand and among institutions, 
market creating and regulating institutions (ER, CP) have the most important impact 
so as DSR and FD for political institutions. IMR is more sensitive to institutions in 
CIS countries than in the new EU members. How may we explain this differentiated 
sensibility to institutional arrangements? 
A first element of explanation is certainly the EU Enlargement process and 
mainly the Acquis communautaire criterion. Before joining the EU, new members had 
to improve considerably their institutions in order to fulfil most of the EU 
requirements. Such an improvement created an institutional shift towards more 
stability and transparent rules. The Acquis communautaire was an accelerator for 
institutional building and reshaping in candidates countries. 
A second element of explanation is that, compared to EU members, CIS’ 
institutional arrangements may be seen as immature, unstable and less reliable 
because the informal institutions and political institutions have a relative important 
effect on IMR. The role of institutions in improving IMR should be explored and 
deepened.  
This last point suggests that the initial level of development and the starting 
conditions of transition should be taken seriously in consideration. CIS countries 
have deep cultural and ethnical specifications that create conditions for a strong 
informal Institutional pattern which influences the formal Institutions building. This 
situation develops specific conditions for change and generates a large socialist past 
dependence process. A major question we should answer in a future paper is whether 
the differentiated IMR is linked to the UE integration process, to a cultural and 
historical proximity and/or a geographical distance effect. 
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Graph 2 
IMR for New EU Member Panel (1994-2006)
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Graph 3 
Real GDP per capita in US$ for CIS Panel (1994-2006)
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Graph 4 
Real GDP per capita in US$ for the New EU Member Panel (1994-
2006)
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Graph 5 
Real GDP Growth Rate in % (1995-2005)
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